

# IDENTIFYING MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS: A NATURAL LANGUAGE APPROACH

Boraĝan Aruoba    Thomas Drechsel

University of Maryland

NBER Summer Institute 2023

## MOTIVATION

- ▶ Goal:  $\Delta i_t \stackrel{?}{\Rightarrow} Y_t$     Challenge:  $\Delta i_t = f(\Omega_t) + \varepsilon_t$  where  $Y_t \in \Omega_t$
  - ▶ Romer and Romer (2004) run regression  $\Delta i_t = \alpha + \beta i_{t-1} + \gamma X_t + \varepsilon_t^{RR}$ 
    - ▶  $X_t$  contains forecasts from FOMC “Greenbooks”
    - ▶ With residuals  $\hat{\varepsilon}_t^{RR}$  construct IRFs of  $Y_t$
  - ▶ Key assumptions
    1. Forecasts of Fed staff good approximation of information set  $\Omega_t$
    2. Linear specification good approximation of mapping  $f(\cdot)$
- this paper: both assumptions need to be revisited

## THIS PAPER

- ▶ Aims to revive [Romer and Romer \(2004\)](#) using ...
- ▶ Natural language processing:
  - ▶ Turn text in documents prepared for FOMC meetings into data
- ▶ Machine learning:
  - ▶ Include forecasts and large amount of text-based data in regression, also nonlinearly
- ▶ Including the additional information is essential for clean identification

## PREVIEW OF FINDINGS

### 1. Systematic vs. exogenous monetary policy

- ▶ Original Romer-Romer:  $R^2 = 0.5$  implies 50% of  $\Delta i$  are shocks
- ▶ Our approach:  $R^2 = 0.94$

### 2. What are monetary policy shocks?

- ▶ FOMC decisions unrelated to staff's analysis – “surprises to the staff”
- ▶ E.g. based on non-systematic **long-run credibility concerns**
- ▶ Correlated with high-frequency surprises in market rates

### 3. Get theoretically consistent IRFs in updated sample

- ▶  $i \uparrow \Rightarrow Y \downarrow P \downarrow$  *risk premia*  $\uparrow$  *SP500*  $\downarrow$
- ▶ Not the case for original Romer-Romer because forecasts lack relevant information

## METHODOLOGY

## STEP 1. PROCESS RAW TEXT

- ▶ Download documents for scheduled FOMC meetings
  - ▶ Beigebook & Tealbook A (earlier: Red- & Greenbook)
- ▶ Start in 1982, when Fed began targeting FFR as policy tool ([Thornton, 2006](#))
- ▶ End in December 2016  $\Rightarrow$  276 FOMC meetings  
(some of subsequent analysis is pre-ZLB)
- ▶ Beigebook-only version allows us to extract shocks as FOMC meetings happen

## STEP 2. IDENTIFY ECONOMIC CONCEPTS

- ▶ Store all singles, doubles, and triples
  - ▶ “... consumer price inflation ...” gives a triple, two doubles and three singles
  - ▶ “... inflation and economic activity ...” gives us three singles and one double
- ▶ Select most frequently discussed **economic concepts** → final list amounts to 296

combine/exclude






## STEP 3. CONSTRUCT SENTIMENT

- ▶ Inspired by [Hassan, Hollander, van Lent, and Tahoun \(2022\)](#)
- ▶ Consider the 10 words before and after each concept's appearance
- ▶ Each *positive* word gives a score of +1 and each *negative* word of -1
  - ▶ Classification based on enhanced version of [Loughran and McDonald \(2011\)](#)
- ▶ Sum up scores within meeting and scale by total number of words

dictionary

robustness

# EXAMPLE: SENTIMENT AROUND “ECONOMIC ACTIVITY”



More

## STEP 4. RUN RIDGE REGRESSION

$$\Delta i_t = \alpha + \beta i_{t-1} + \Gamma(\widetilde{\mathbf{X}}_t, \mathbf{Z}_t) + \varepsilon_t^*$$

- ▶  $\widetilde{\mathbf{X}}_t$ : numerical forecasts: all variables, lags, differencing
- ▶  $\mathbf{Z}_t$ : sentiment indicators with lags
- ▶  $\Gamma(\cdot)$  captures non-linearity  $\rightarrow$  implement as linear-quadratic specification
  
- ▶ Curse of dimensionality: up to **3,226 variables** for **210 observations**
- ▶ Solution: ridge regression

## STEP 4. RUN RIDGE REGRESSION

- ▶ While OLS minimizes  $RSS$ , Ridge minimizes  $RSS + \lambda \sum_n^N \beta_n^2$ 
  - ▶ Giannone, Lenza, and Primiceri (2022): dense prediction techniques tend to be preferable for economic data
  - ▶ Try alternatives, e.g. LASSO and general elastic net
- ▶ Optimally choose tuning parameter  $\lambda$  based on 10-fold cross-validation
  - ▶ Maximizes 'out-of-sample' ability in different subsamples (folds)
- ▶ Fixed parameter ridge with large amount of information is flexible enough to also capture time-variation in the policy rule

INTERMEDIATE VALIDATION EXERCISE:  
DO SENTIMENT INDICATORS PROVIDE USEFUL INFORMATION?

# DO SENTIMENT INDICATORS PROVIDE USEFUL INFORMATION?

- ▶ Discussion of Romer and Romer (2004) by Cochrane (2004):
  - ▶ Enough to orthogonalize FFR changes with respect to the staff's forecasts alone ...
  - ▶ ... IF forecast for variable of interest incorporates available information efficiently
  - ▶ Argument relies on:

$$\textit{Greenbook forecast of } X = E[X|\Omega]$$

## DO SENTIMENT INDICATORS PROVIDE USEFUL INFORMATION?

- ▶ We provide evidence that Greenbook forecast best interpreted as **modal**

*"I would characterize our forecasts over the years as an effort to present a meaningful, modal forecast of the most likely outcome. When we felt that there was some skewness to the probability distribution, we tried to identify it. In this instance, as we looked at the recent data, we felt that there was a greater thickness in the area of our probability distribution a little above our modal forecast."*

(Michael Prell, director of RS in FOMC meeting on July 2-3, 1996)

- ▶ We show econometrically that sentiments predict forecast errors, so  $X \neq E[X|\Omega]$ 
  - ▶ Information from sentiments needed to clean  $\Delta i_t \rightarrow$  want higher  $R^2$

# DO SENTIMENT INDICATORS PROVIDE USEFUL INFORMATION?

Left hand side: Greenbook unemployment rate forecast errors								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	current quarter	1-quarter ahead	1-year ahead	2-years ahead	current quarter	1-quarter ahead	1-year ahead	2-years ahead
First PC of all sentiments	-0.029* [0.016]	-0.114** [0.049]	-0.445** [0.190]	-0.622** [0.238]				
Economic activity sentiment					-0.026 [0.016]	-0.098** [0.048]	-0.285* [0.165]	-0.363** [0.171]
Constant	-0.019 [0.014]	-0.070** [0.033]	-0.082 [0.121]	0.059 [0.201]	-0.019 [0.014]	-0.069** [0.035]	-0.077 [0.145]	0.160 [0.258]
R-squared	0.045	0.149	0.248	0.208	0.033	0.097	0.090	0.055
Obs	210	210	210	62	210	210	210	62

- ▶ Unemployment rate forecast errors predictable with sentiments other variables
- ▶ Interpretation: negative activity sentiment  $\Rightarrow$  positive error is consistent with negative sentiment capturing thicker upper tail
- ▶ Later: this affects whether IRFs to monetary policy shocks consistent with theory



## RESULTS OF THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE


# $R^2$ ACROSS DIFFERENT REGRESSION MODELS

		(1) $R^2$ with 10-word sentiment (main specification)	(2) $R^2$ with 5-word sentiment (robustness)
Romer-Romer original OLS with subset of forecasts	19		0.50
Ridge with extended set of forecasts	133		0.55
Ridge with all forecasts & sentiments (linear)	429	0.65	0.66
Ridge with all forecasts & sentiments (nonlinear)	858	0.75	0.77
Ridge with all forecasts & sentiments (linear with lags)	1,613	0.87	0.88
Ridge with all forecasts & sentiments (nonlinear with lags)	3,226	0.94	0.95

- ▶  $R^2$  tells us how much of the variation in  $\Delta i$  is explained by systematic policy
- ▶ Wider set of forecasts, human language, lags and nonlinearities all rise  $R^2$

more details on rhs

# ESTIMATED MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS



Correlation: 0.83

## WHAT ARE MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS?

- ▶ One might interpret shocks as “surprises to the staff”
- ▶ We provide case studies for meetings with largest estimated shocks
- ▶ We find that FOMC made decisions based on considerations not directly and **systematically** related to the economic outlook
- ▶ For **November 1994 meeting**, largest tightening shock in our sample:
  - ▶ Staff analysis suggests market had already built in a 50bp rate hike
  - ▶ Greenspan advocated a larger hike: “a mild surprise would be of significant value.”
  - ▶ The other FOMC members agree and emphasize **long-run credibility**
  - ▶ Increase is 75bp, we estimate a 21bp contractionary shock

## OUR MEASURE VS. HIGH FREQUENCY MEASURES

- ▶ Alternative: use surprise changes in market rates around FOMC announcements
  - ▶ Gürkaynak et al. (2005), Gertler and Karadi (2015), Swanson (2021)
  - ▶ Might contain “information effect” and “Fed response to news” (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018; Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco, 2021; Bauer and Swanson, 2023)
- ▶ Our approach orthogonalizes changes in target FFR
- ▶ Practical considerations:
  - ▶ Our shocks available over longer sample, HF measures typically start in 1990's,
  - ▶ HF measures can be extracted from unscheduled meetings and speeches
- ▶ How do our shocks and surprises compare?

## OUR MEASURE VS. HIGH FREQUENCY MEASURES

	(1)	(2)
	Our measure	Original Romer-Romer
Correlation shocks with surprises	0.49	0.36
Correlation top 10 shocks with surprises	0.77	0.61
Correlation top 10 surprises with shocks	0.51	0.18

**Notes.** Comparison with the FFR surprises constructed by [Swanson \(2021\)](#). These can directly be matched to our shocks and Romer-Romer shocks for scheduled FOMC meetings. The sample period covers 1991 to 2008.

- ▶ Our shocks more strongly correlated with surprises than original Romer-Romer
- ▶ Correlation generally higher for large shocks and large surprises [graph](#)
- ▶ Both methods yield imperfect measures for object of interest


WHY IT MATTERS:  
THE EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS

## SETTING TO ESTIMATE IRFS


- ▶ Directly follow monthly BVAR of [Jarocinski and Karadi \(2020\)](#)
- ▶ Shock series is 1982:10 to 2008:10, but can estimate BVAR to 2016
- ▶ System includes 1-year Treasury yield, log of the S&P500, log real GDP, unemployment rate, log GDP deflator, excess bond premium (EBP)
- ▶ Report 16th - 84th and 5th-95th percentiles
- ▶ Results similar with local projections approach ([Jordà, 2005](#)) lp



# FULL NONLINEAR RIDGE VS. RR OLS




## DIFFERENCES IN SHOCKS LINKED TO ERRORS IN MODAL FORECASTS



- ▶ When GB unemployment forecast error too optimistic (because mean > mode), Romer-Romer shock implies more easing than our shock

## EXPLAINING THE IMPACT ON THE RESULTING IRFS

- ▶ Suppose for simplicity  $i_t$  is set based only on  $\mathbb{E}(u_{t+1})$  and  $\mathbb{E}(u_{t+1}) > mode(u_{t+1})$
- ▶ Predicting  $i_t$  with modal forecast of  $u_t$  only will imply an easing shock:



- ▶ But this means easing shocks are estimated when unemployment goes up!
- ▶ If these instances frequent enough in the sample, the resulting IRF will be incorrect

## CONCLUSION

## CONCLUSION

- ▶ Classic question in macroeconomics: what are the effects of monetary policy?
- ▶ This paper estimates monetary policy shocks by:
  - ▶ Accurately capturing the information available to the FOMC
  - ▶ Allowing for nonlinearities in the decision process
- ▶ NLP and ML techniques enable us to retrieve shocks with desirable proprieties
- ▶ Monetary policy has sizeable effects on activity, inflation, asset prices, risk premia
- ▶ **We make our estimated shocks and sentiment indicators available online!**

## REFERENCES

- BAUER, M. D. AND E. T. SWANSON (2023): "An Alternative Explanation for the "Fed Information Effect"," *American Economic Review*, 113, 664–700.
- COCHRANE, J. (2004): "Comments on 'A new measure of monetary shocks: Derivation and implications' by Christina Romer and David Romer," *July 17, 2004, presented at NBER EFG Meeting*.
- GERTLER, M. AND P. KARADI (2015): "Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs, and Economic Activity," *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 7, 44–76.
- GIANNONE, D., M. LENZA, AND G. E. PRIMICERI (2022): "Economic predictions with big data: The illusion of sparsity," *Econometrica*.
- GÜRKAYNAK, R. S., B. SACK, AND E. SWANSON (2005): "The Sensitivity of Long-Term Interest Rates to Economic News: Evidence and Implications for Macroeconomic Models," *American Economic Review*, 95, 425–436.
- HASSAN, T. A., S. HOLLANDER, L. VAN LENT, AND A. TAHOUN (2022): "The Global Impact of Brexit Uncertainty," *The Journal of Finance (Forthcoming)*.
- JAROCINSKI, M. AND P. KARADI (2020): "Deconstructing Monetary Policy Surprises—The Role of Information Shocks," *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 12, 1–43.
- JORDÀ, O. (2005): "Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local Projections," *American Economic Review*, 95, 161–182.
- LOUGHRAN, T. AND B. McDONALD (2011): "When Is a Liability Not a Liability? Textual Analysis, Dictionaries, and 10-Ks," *The Journal of Finance*, 66, 35–65.
- MIRANDA-AGRIPPINO, S. AND G. RICCO (2021): "The Transmission of Monetary Policy Shocks," *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 13, 74–107.
- NAKAMURA, E. AND J. STEINSSON (2018): "High-frequency identification of monetary non-neutrality: the information effect," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133, 1283–1330.
- ROMER, C. D. AND D. H. ROMER (2004): "A New Measure of Monetary Shocks: Derivation and Implications," *American Economic Review*, 94, 1055–1084.
- SWANSON, E. T. (2021): "Measuring the effects of federal reserve forward guidance and asset purchases on financial markets," *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 118, 32–53.
- THORNTON, D. L. (2006): "When Did the FOMC Begin Targeting the Federal Funds Rate? What the Verbatim Transcripts Tell Us," *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, 38, 2039–2071.

## APPENDIX SLIDES

## COMBINING AND EXCLUDING CONCEPTS

- ▶ Using the raw list of economic concepts, we combine/exclude overlapping concepts
  - ▶ Combine singular and plural, e.g. “oil price” and “oil prices”
  - ▶ Separate mutually exclusive important concepts, e.g. keep “commercial real estate” and “residential real estate,” but drop “real estate”
  - ▶ Subsume unimportant concepts if sufficiently related, e.g. drop “consumer credit” and “bank credit,” but keep “credit”
  - ▶ Exclude direct mention of policy rate, since that is discussion of the action

Back




## EXAMPLES OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE WORDS


<b>Positive</b>	<b>Negative</b>
adequate	adversely
advantage	aggravate
benefit	bad
boost	burdensome
confident	collapse
conducive	concerning
desirable	decline
diligent	deficient
encouraging	eroded
excellent	exacerbate
...	...

Back


# ALTERNATIVE SENTIMENT CONSTRUCTION



Back




# MORTGAGES




Back

# INFLATION EXPECTATIONS




Back

# EURO AREA




Back

# CONSUMPTION



Back

# LABOR MARKET



Back



## ADDITIONAL FORECAST ERROR RESULTS: OUTPUT GROWTH

Panel (b): output forecast errors on LHS								
	current quarter	1 quarter ahead	1 year ahead	2 years ahead	current quarter	1 quarter ahead	1 year ahead	2 years ahead
First PC of all sentiments	0.121 [0.220]	0.411 [0.325]	0.540* [0.310]	-0.171 [0.402]				
Economic activity sentiment					0.036 [0.228]	0.146 [0.272]	0.079 [0.251]	-0.485 [0.403]
Constant	0.300* [0.167]	0.139 [0.276]	-0.252 [0.340]	-0.380 [0.750]	0.298* [0.163]	0.131 [0.299]	-0.268 [0.374]	0.442 [0.717]
R-squared	0.005	0.030	0.049	0.003	0.000	0.003	0.001	0.021
Obs	206	204	198	54	206	204	198	54

Back

## ADDITIONAL FORECAST ERROR RESULTS: INFLATION

Panel (c): inflation forecast errors on LHS								
	current quarter	1 quarter ahead	1 year ahead	2 years ahead	current quarter	1 quarter ahead	1 year ahead	2 years ahead
First PC of all sentiments	0.148 [0.101]	0.170 [0.133]	0.142 [0.173]	-0.011 [0.164]				
Economic activity sentiment					0.263*** [0.092]	0.222* [0.126]	0.236* [0.141]	0.013 [0.214]
Constant	-0.163 [0.109]	-0.136 [0.167]	-0.267 [0.208]	0.056 [0.216]	-0.167 [0.103]	-0.140 [0.160]	-0.271 [0.201]	-0.019 [0.207]
R-squared	0.029	0.032	0.017	0.013	0.081	0.049	0.041	0.000
Obs	210	210	210	62	210	210	210	62


Back

## WHAT EXPLAINS THE SYSTEMATIC COMPONENT?


Sentiment PC1		Sentiment PC2		Numerical forecast PC1	
economy	0.141	advanced foreign economies	-0.141	output growth (+1)	0.187
firms	0.139	merchandise	0.140	output growth (0)	0.175
economic activity	0.136	foreign economies	0.135	bus. fixed inv. growth (+2)	0.160
manufacturing activity	0.133	credit standards	-0.131	ind. prod. growth (+1)	0.160
commercial real estate	0.131	farm	0.127	output growth (+2)	0.158
manufacturing firms	0.130	cash	0.125	nominal output growth (+1)	0.153
labor market	0.125	core inflation	-0.124	housing starts (+1)	0.151
services	0.123	industrial production	0.123	housing starts (+2)	0.150
consumer confidence	0.118	trade deficit	0.121	housing starts (+3)	0.150
industries	0.117	developing countries	0.119	housing starts (0)	0.149

- ▶ Real activity variables important for sentiment and forecast PCs
- ▶ Limited role for sentiment around price and financial variables

# OUR MEASURE VS. HIGH FREQUENCY MEASURES



# LOCAL PROJECTION RESULTS



Back